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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 8, 1993, Amanda Demich gave a taped statement to the Lorain, Ohio
police department that her boyfriend, Joseph Dowd, had beaten her.1 A police
detective took photographs of Demich’s injuries, which included bruises on her face
and thighs.2 Demich later testified before a grand jury that Dowd caused the injuries
shown in the photographs by hitting her.3 On April 13, 1993, Dowd was indicted on

1

State v. Dowd, No. 93CA005638, 1994 WL 18645, at *1 (Ohio App. 9 Dist. 1994).

2

Id.

3

Id.
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counts of felonious assault, kidnapping, and assault.4 Three weeks later, though,
Demich recanted her previous statements to the police and grand jury by stating that
Dowd was not the person who assaulted her.5 Demich’s recantation essentially left
the prosecution without a case against Dowd.
The situation in Dowd illustrates a common challenge that prosecutors face in
domestic violence cases. In a conventional criminal case the prosecution can expect
to rely on the cooperation and participation of the victim to obtain a conviction.6 In a
domestic violence case, however, the prosecution will often encounter victims who
refuse to testify, recant previous statements, or whose credibility is attacked with
questions on why they remained in a battering relationship.7 In an attempt to explain
this behavior by the victims of domestic violence, prosecutors in many jurisdictions
now rely on expert testimony relating to the battered woman syndrome.8 In Ohio,
however, a prosecutor in a domestic violence case like Dowd cannot introduce any
expert testimony to explain the behavior of the victim.
Since the mid-1980’s, expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome has
been widely used by female murder defendants who claim that they have killed their
batterers in self-defense.9 The Ohio Supreme Court first permitted such use of the
syndrome in 1990.10 More recently, courts in several jurisdictions have accepted
expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome introduced by prosecutors in
domestic violence cases.11 Despite this growing trend, Ohio courts have prohibited
it.12
4

Id.

5

Id.

6

Audrey Rogers, Prosecutorial Use of Expert Testimony in Domestic Violence Cases:
From Recantation to Refusal to Testify, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 67, 68 (1998).
7

Id.

8

Id.; see also David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the
Age of Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 96 (1997).
9

Rogers, supra note 6, at 68; see also State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990); State v.
Daws, 662 N.E.2d 805 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
10

Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 974-75.

11

Rogers, supra note 6, at 68-69; see Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir.
1991); People v. Morgan, 68 Cal. Rptr.2d 772 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); People v. Gadlin, 92 Cal.
Rptr.2d 890 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Lafferty, 9 P.3d 1132 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999); State
v. Borelli, 629 A.2d 1105 (Conn. 1993); State v. Clark, 926 P.2d 194 (Haw. 1996); State v.
Cababag, 850 P.2d 716 (Haw. Ct. App. 1993); Carnahan v. State 81 N.E.2d 1164 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1997); State v. Giffin, 564 N.W.2d 370 (Iowa 1997); Commonwealth v. Goetzendanner,
679 N.E.2d 240 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997); People v. Christel, 537 N.W.2d 194 (Mich. 1995);
State v. Searles, 680 A.2d 612 (N.H. 1996); State v. Frost, 577 A.2d 1282 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1990); People v. Hryckewicz, 634 N.Y.S.2d 297 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); State v.
Ciskie, 751 P.2d. 1165 (Wash. 1988); Sate v. Bednarz, 507 N.W.2d 168 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993);
see also Isaacs v. State, 659 N.E.2d 1036 (Ind. 1995) (allowing expert testimony on the
syndrome in prosecution of husband for murder to show that couple did not have friendly
relationship).
12

See Dowd, No. 93CA005638, 1994 WL 18645; see also State v. Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d
665 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
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It is only a matter of time before the Ohio courts will again face a situation where
a prosecutor wants to admit expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome to
explain the seemingly abnormal behavior of a victim of domestic violence. The
growing modern trend towards allowance of the testimony,13 and the arguments of
several commentators supporting allowance,14 will no doubt have an impact on how
the court reacts to this issue in the future. Before any change can take place,
however, prosecutors in Ohio must develop an appropriate approach for introducing
testimony on the syndrome under the Rules of Evidence.
This note contends that Ohio should join the modern trend and allow expert
testimony on the battered woman syndrome in a limited form in domestic violence
prosecutions. Part II of this note explores the syndrome and its origins. Part III
provides background on the evidentiary uses of the syndrome in Ohio. It discusses
the emergence of the battered woman syndrome in Ohio courts, and then examines
the unsuccessful initial attempts by prosecutors in Ohio to use expert testimony on
the syndrome.
Part IV looks at how several jurisdictions outside of Ohio have addressed this
issue. Part V presents the argument that prosecutors in Ohio should be allowed to
introduce battered woman evidence in domestic violence cases. To provide a basis
for this argument, it begins by setting forth the applicable Ohio Rules of Evidence.
Next, it examines each of the arguments currently cited in Ohio against prosecutorial
use of battered woman evidence, and attempts to rebut each one in turn. Finally, it
proposes a framework for the prosecutorial introduction of testimony on the
syndrome that will enhance the likelihood of overturning the precedent in Ohio. Part
VI provides concluding remarks.
II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
A. The Problem of Domestic Violence
According to the American Institute on Domestic Violence, between three and
four million women are battered each year in the United States.15 Each year nearly
1,500 of these women are killed by their batterer.16 Battering is the single most
common cause of injury to American women, more common than car accidents,
muggings, and rape combined.17

13

See note 11, supra; see also Part IV, infra.

14

See Rogers, supra note 6; Diana Patton, “He Never Hit Me” – The Need for Expert
Testimony in Domestic Violence Cases, 1994 ARIZONA ATTORNEY 10; James Martin Truss,
The Subjection of Women … Still: Unfulfilled Promises of Protection for Women Victims of
Domestic Violence, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1149 (1995).
15
American Institute on Domestic Violence, Domestic Violence Statistics; Crime
Statistics; Workplace Violence Statistics, available at http://www.aidv-usa.com/Statistics.htm.
(last visited January 26, 2004).
16

Myrna S. Raeder, The Double-Edged Sword: Admissibility of Battered Woman
Syndrome By and Against Batterers in Cases Implicating Domestic Violence, 67 U. COLO. L.
REV. 789, 792 (1996).
17

A.M. Keith, Domestic Violence and the Court System, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 105, 106
(1991) (reprinting of speech by Minnesota Chief Justice Keith at Hamline University, 1991).
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Scholars trace the roots of domestic violence against women back for thousands
of years. The violent punishment of wives is known to have been allowed, approved
and expected in many cultures from the time of ancient Egypt until as recently as the
early American common law.18 The common law “rule of thumb” permitted men to
beat their wives “with a rod or stick no larger than a man’s thumb or small enough to
pass through a wedding band.”19 Commentators suggest that the rule was viewed as
a “natural and necessary right of control” that was incident to the man’s role as head
of the family.20
The problem surrounding domestic violence has been described as “a conspiracy
of silence.”21 Sociologist Del Martin offered the following vivid description of this
silence: “We can picture a very thick door locked shut. On the inner side is a
woman trying hard not to cry out for help. On the other side are those who could and
should be helping but instead are going about their business as if she weren’t
there.”22 Dr. Lenore Walker, with her book The Battered Woman, took one of the
largest steps towards opening this proverbial “thick door.”
B. The Battered Woman Syndrome
Dr. Walker is widely recognized as the first person to identify the battered
woman syndrome.23 From 1978 through June 1981, Dr. Walker conducted a study of
over 400-battered women to learn about the effects of domestic violence.24 Her
research led her to define the syndrome as “a cluster of psychological symptoms”
that women develop from living in a violent relationship.25
18

See Patton, supra note 14, at 10.

19

Truss, supra note 14, at 1157; see also State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60 (1874).

20

Truss, supra note 14, at 1157. Truss also states that the rule was justified because the
husband was often civilly or criminally liable for the actions of his wife.
21

Keith, supra note 17, at 106.

22

Id.

23

Rogers, supra note 6, at 71.

24

LENORE E. A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, 2d ed., ix (2000). Dr.
Walker originally published the first edition of the BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME in 1984.
The first edition was, “written to present an integration of the final analysis from [her]
research project into the body of literature specializing in understanding spouse abuse that was
available at the time.” The second edition attempts, “to analyze the original study results in
light of the new clinical and empirical research and determine if the original conclusions still
hold true today.” Dr. Walker ultimately decided that the original conclusions still hold true.
Id. at ix–x.
25

Id. at ix. Dr. Walker stated that, “[t]he goals of the research project were to identify key
psychological and sociological factors that compose the battered woman syndrome, test
specific theories about battered woman, and collect comprehensive data on battered woman.”
Id. Dr. Walker tested the “learned helplessness theory” and the “cycle theory of battering.”
The first test relied on the hypothesis that “learned helplessness” is responsible for the
apparent emotional, cognitive and behavioral deficits observed in the battered woman that
negatively influence her from leaving a relationship after the battering occurs. The second test
relies on the hypothesis that further victimization occurs by the nature of the “cycle of
violence.” Id.
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The battering relationship itself is often described as cyclical in nature, with three
distinct phases: tension building, confrontation, and contrition.26 During the “tension
building” phase, the woman is generally compliant, often feeling as though she
deserves the abuse.27 Once the tension reaches a boiling point, the batterer will erupt
uncontrollably, committing a violent act.28 Next, in an abrupt about-face, the abuser
will exhibit seemingly intense love and affection towards his victim.29 The
victimized women are then led to believe that the violence was an isolated incident
and that it will not continue.30 This cycle of violence may leave the victim with
feelings of learned helplessness, low self-esteem, depression, minimization
techniques, self-isolation, and passivity.31 It is this collection of resulting symptoms
that has come to be known as the “battered woman syndrome.”
The psychological reactions exhibited by victims of domestic violence can prove
to be troublesome for a prosecutor in a domestic violence case. This is because the
prosecutor’s case is normally built around the testimony of the victim. A battering
victim’s behavior can often appear baffling and even frustrating to the average
juror.32 Many victims, as a result of the contrition of their abuser, remain in abusive
relationships or refuse to pursue legal action against the batterer.33 The defense will
attack the legitimacy of an alleged victim’s claim because of her delay in leaving the
relationship and seeking police intervention. Additionally, victims frequently recant
previously made statements to the police or prosecutors that implicate their
significant other as an abuser.34
Historically, if the victim recanted her story or was not cooperative with the
investigation, the prosecutor would be forced to drop the case. The advent of “no
drop” policies within many prosecutors’ offices, however, has forced prosecutors to
face these issues within the context of litigation.35 In an attempt to explain the
sometimes seemingly abnormal behavior by the victims, prosecutors have begun to
look towards expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome.
III. OHIO COURTS AND THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
A. Emergence of Battered Woman Evidence in Ohio
Ohio courts have approached the battered woman syndrome very cautiously. The
Ohio Supreme Court initially addressed the battered woman syndrome in 1981, in
26

Rogers, supra note 6, at 71; see also Truss, supra note 14, at 1170-1172.

27

Truss, supra note 14, at 1170.

28

Id. at 1170-71.

29

Id. at 1171.

30

Id.

31

Rogers, supra note 6, at 71-72.

32

Id. at 72.

33

See id; see also Truss, supra note 14, at 1171-72.

34

Rogers, supra note 6, at 72.

35

See id. at 73. A “no-drop” policy essentially requires a prosecutor, once informed of a
domestic violence situation, to pursue prosecution regardless of the victim’s cooperation. Id.
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State v. Thomas.36 In Thomas, the defendant, Kathy Thomas, was indicted and found
guilty of murdering Reuben Daniels, her common law husband.37 Thomas and
Daniels had lived together in a “stormy relationship” for about three years before the
killing,38 during which Thomas was repeatedly beaten.39 Thomas admitted to the
murder, but claimed self-defense because she feared for her life.40
At trial, Thomas’ counsel attempted to call an expert witness to testify on the
battered woman syndrome to aid the jury in weighing the evidence concerning
Thomas’ subjective state of mind at the time of the killing.41 The trial court refused
to admit the testimony and Thomas was convicted.42 In upholding the trial court’s
decision, the Ohio Supreme Court cited four reasons for finding the proffered expert
testimony inadmissible.43 First, the court stated that the testimony was, “irrelevant
and immaterial to the issue of whether defendant acted in self-defense at the time of
the shooting.”44 Second, “the subject of the expert testimony is within the
understanding of the jury.”45 Third, “the battered [woman] syndrome is not
sufficiently developed, as a matter of commonly accepted scientific knowledge, to

36

423 N.E.2d 137 (Ohio 1981).

37

Id. at 138.

38

Id.

39

Id.

40

Id. It was undisputed that Thomas shot Daniels once in the forehead and once in the left
arm. Thomas gave three different versions of the killing to the police. In the first version, the
couple had an argument over cooking and as a result Daniels became very angry and slapped
Thomas and pushed her down. Thomas stated that after she got up she walked to the chair
where Daniels was sitting and shot him. Id. In the second version, Thomas stated the couple
had an argument, which led to Daniels pushing her down on the couch. This time, however,
further arguments ensued and as Daniels was rising from the chair to attack Thomas, she
reached for the gun on the couch and shot him. Id. In the third story, Daniels, upon pushing
Thomas to the couch, turned and walked away from her when she picked up the gun. Thomas
followed Daniels and stated “I’ve had enough,” and then shot Daniels. Id.
41

Id.

42

Id. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial because of the
trial court’s refusal to allow the expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome and the
peculiar state of mind which might prompt the shooting of the “battering husband.” Id.
43

Id. at 140.

44

Id. The court stated that in a trial where the evidence raises an issue of self-defense, “the
only admissible evidence pertaining to that defense is evidence which establishes that
defendant had a bona-fide belief she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm,
and that the only means of escape from such danger was through the use of deadly force.” Id.
at 139.
45
Id. at 140. The court believed that the jury was able to understand and determine
whether self-defense had been proven without expert testimony on the battered woman
syndrome. Id. at 139. The court stated that, “the jury will base its decision upon the material
and relevant evidence concerning the participants’ words and actions before, at, and following
the murder, including defendant’s explanation of the surrounding circumstances.” Id.
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warrant testimony under the guise of expertise.”46 Finally, the court believed that the
prejudicial impact of the testimony outweighed its probative value.47
Thomas survived several challenges over the next decade and remained good law
until 1990.48 In State v. Koss, the Ohio Supreme Court was again faced with the
same issue as in Thomas.49 Defendant, Brenda Koss, after several years of brutal
beatings and threats to her life, killed her husband.50 Koss claimed self-defense and
at trial she sought to introduce expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome in
support of her claim.51 Following Thomas, the trial court refused the testimony.52
Koss was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, and was sentenced to eight to
twenty-five years in prison.53
Justice Alice Robie Resnick wrote the majority opinion for the court in Koss.54
Justice Resnick began by discussing Thomas’s emphasis on the syndrome’s lack of
scientific basis.55 She contended that in the nine years since the holding in Thomas,

46

Id. at 140. The court stated that the expert testimony was “distinctly related to some
science, profession or occupation so as to be beyond the ken of the average lay person.” Id. at
139. Additionally, there was no general acceptance of the expert’s particular methodology.
Id.
47

Id. at 140. The court stated that it believed “the expert testimony offered here would
tend to stereotype defendant, causing the jury to become prejudiced.” Id. It feared that the
jury would decide the case based on the typical facts of the battered woman and not the actual
facts. Id.
48

See, e.g., State v. Branham, No. C-850269, 1986 WL 6810, (Ohio App. 1 Dist. 1986);
Tourlakis v. Morris, 738 F.Supp. 1128 (S.D. Ohio 1990); State v. Tourlakis, No. 52035, 1987
WL 10040 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. 1987).
49

551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990).

50

Id. at 971. Koss was questioned at the police department after her husband’s body was
found in the Kosses’ house. She told the police that she came home around midnight and went
into the bedroom and began changing. She stated that her husband then “hauled off” and hit
her. Id. The next thing that she remembered was hearing a “noise or something” and seeing a
holster on the ground, but she denied shooting her husband. Id. She stated that she did not
remember seeing the gun until she was in the car fleeing the scene. Id. At trial her story
changed significantly. She stated that when she came home she saw the gun on a bedside
table and it frightened her. Id. She testified that, before her husband hit her, she “must have
picked up the gun” out of fear. Id. After her husband hit her she heard a noise, which
sounded like gurgling blood. Id. She stated that, “I purposely did not kill Michael Koss,” and
“[I]f I killed him, it was an accident.” Id.
51

Id. Koss sought to introduce experts to testify that there are two components of the
battered woman syndrome. The first component is establishing that the woman is, in fact, a
battered woman. Second, is that “at the time of the incident, all the prior battering incidents
appear in a flashback to the woman, thus triggering an immediate fear of death and causing
her to respond almost instinctively in self-defense.” Id. at 972.
52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Id.

55

Id.
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several books and articles were written on the battered woman syndrome.56 She
cited to decisions in several jurisdictions that had already approved the use of expert
testimony on the battered woman syndrome.57 Then, following a general discussion
of expert testimony rules in Ohio, Justice Resnick discussed in general terms the
scope of admissible expert testimony. She stated that “[e]xpert testimony in Ohio is
admissible if it will assist the trier of fact in search of the truth.”58 Justice Resnick
also cited Ohio Evidence Rule 702’s requirement that the expert testimony must be
“specialized” and “assist the trier of fact to understand evidence or to determine a
fact in issue.”59 She wrote that “[e]xpert testimony regarding the battered woman
syndrome can be admitted to help the jury not only to understand the battered
woman syndrome but also to determine whether the defendant had reasonable
grounds for an honest belief that she was in imminent danger when considering the
issue of self-defense.”60 Thus, Thomas was explicitly overruled to the extent that
expert testimony relative to the battered woman syndrome could now be admitted to
support the affirmative defense of self-defense.61
For the purposes of this Note, however, Justice Resnick’s dicta regarding the
syndrome itself are more important than the specific holding in Koss.62 Justice
Resnick maintained:
Expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome would help dispel the
ordinary lay person’s perception that a woman in a battering relationship
is free to leave at any time. The expert evidence would counter any
“common sense” conclusions by the jury that if the beatings were really
that bad the woman would have left her husband much earlier. Popular
misconceptions about battered women would be put to rest, including the
beliefs that the women are masochistic and enjoy the beatings and that
they intentionally provoke their husbands into fits of rage.63
She acknowledged that it might seem as if the expert is giving testimony on a subject
of common knowledge, the reasonableness of a person’s fear of imminent serious
danger.64 Regarding the purpose of the testimony, though, Justice Resnick
contended:

56

Id.

57
Id.; see People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); State v. Hodges, 716
P.2d 563 (Kan. 1986); Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1981); Hawthorne v. State, 408
So.2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984).
58

Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 973.

59

Id.

60

Id.

61

Id. at 974–75.

62

See Part V.B. infra, for a discussion on the importance of Justice Resnick’s dicta in

Koss.
63

Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 973.

64

Id. at 974.
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It is aimed at an area where the purported common knowledge of the jury
may be very much mistaken, an area where jurors’ logic, drawn from their
own experience, may lead to a wholly incorrect conclusion, an area where
expert knowledge would enable the jurors to disregard their prior
conclusions as being common myths rather than common knowledge.65
This reasoning applies with equal force to the prosecutorial use of expert testimony
on the battered woman syndrome in Ohio.
Moreover, the court’s recognition of these matters in Koss is now also part of
Ohio statutory law. Six months before Koss came before the Ohio Supreme Court on
December 5 1989, Representative Joseph Koziura introduced a bill on the House
floor of the Ohio legislature. House Bill 484 was introduced as the General
Assembly’s official recognition that the battered woman syndrome was a matter of
commonly accepted scientific knowledge and that the subject matter is not within the
general understanding of average person.66 The legislation was also designed to
permit evidence on the syndrome to prove self-defense.67 House Bill 484, now
codified as Ohio Revised Code § 2901.06, was eventually signed into law on August
6, 1990, approximately five months after the decision in Koss was handed down.68
Subsection (A) of § 2901.06 declares that the General Assembly recognizes both
of the following in regard to the battered woman syndrome:
(1) That the syndrome currently is a matter of commonly accepted
scientific knowledge;
(2) That the subject matter and details of the syndrome are not within the
general understanding or experience of a person who is a member of the
general populace and are not within the field of common knowledge.69
Subsection (B) continues by stating:
If a person is charged with an offense involving the use of force against
another and the person, as a defense to the offense charged, raises the
affirmative defense of self-defense, the person may introduce expert
testimony of the ‘battered woman syndrome’ and expert testimony that
the person suffered from that syndrome as evidence to establish the
requisite belief of an imminent danger of death or great bodily harm that
is necessary, as an element of the affirmative defense, to justify the
person’s use of the force in question. The introduction of any expert
65

Id.

66

H.R.
118-HB484,
Reg.
Sess.,
at
2
(Ohio
http://han2.hannah.com/htbin/f.com/oh_ban_118:HB484.lsc.

1990),

available

at

67

Id.

68
Id. The house initially passed the bill by a vote of 83 – 9, on March 1, 1990. Id. The
senate then passed the bill by a vote of 31 – 1 on June 14, 1990. Id. The house passed the
final amended version on July 20, 1990 and the bill became effective on November 5, 1990.
Id. The importance of the timing of the introduction of this bill will be fully developed in Part
V.B. of this note.
69

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (A) (1)-(2) (West 2003).
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testimony under this division shall be in accordance with the Ohio Rules
of Evidence.70
As will be seen in the next section, however, Ohio courts have cited to subsection
(B) of § 2901.06 as a limitation on the use of expert testimony on the battered
woman syndrome. Part V.B. explains why the court’s interpretation is wrong.
B. Initial Prosecutorial Attempts to Use the Battered Woman Syndrome in Ohio
In the years following Koss, two Ohio Courts of Appeals have heard and rejected
prosecutorial attempts to introduce testimony on the syndrome in domestic violence
cases. The Ohio Supreme Court has yet to address this issue, however, seemingly
leaving the door open for future prosecutorial attempts.
Just one year after the initial admission of expert testimony concerning the
battered woman syndrome in Koss, a prosecutor attempted to extend the use of
testimony on the syndrome by introducing it in a domestic violence case.71 State v.
Pargeon involved the prosecution of Randy Pargeon for the alleged battering of his
wife.72 At trial, the prosecution called Diane Roberts, director of the local battered
woman’s shelter, as an expert witness to testify on the syndrome.73 The trial court
permitted the testimony and Pargeon was convicted on two counts of domestic
violence.74 Pargeon appealed his conviction to the Fifth District Court of Appeals.75
On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s
decision.76 The court began its analysis by citing two Ohio Rules of Evidence as
prohibiting expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome in domestic violence
cases. First, the court believed that the testimony was prohibited under Ohio
Evidence Rule 403(A) because the probative value of the testimony was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.77 Second, it stated that Ohio Evidence
Rule 404(B) prohibited the testimony because evidence that Pargeon’s wife is a
battered woman “really serves as evidence of the prior bad acts of [Pargeon] from
which the inference may be drawn that [Pargeon] has the propensity to beat his wife
and that he beat her on this particular occasion.”78
The court, however, cited the holding in Koss and the language of O.R.C.
§ 2901.06 as a “more compelling” reason for not allowing expert testimony on the
battered woman syndrome in domestic violence cases.79 The court reasoned that the
holding in Koss limited the admissibility of expert testimony on the battered woman
70

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (B) (West 2003).

71

Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d 665.

72

Id.

73

Id. at 666.

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Id. See Part V.A., infra, for the language of Ohio Evidence Rule 403(A).

78

Id.; see Part V.A., infra for the language of Ohio Evidence Rule 404(B).

79

Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d at 666.
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syndrome to cases where a woman charged with the murder of her husband uses it to
establish the “imminent danger of death or great bodily harm” element of the
affirmative defense of self-defense.80 Additionally, the court understood O.R.C.
§ 2901.06(B) to limit the use of expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome to
cases where a woman raises the affirmative defense of self-defense. Therefore, the
trial court’s decision was reversed and the case was remanded for further
proceedings.81
Likewise, State v. Dowd involved the prosecution of Joseph Dowd for domestic
violence against Amanda Demich.82 As mentioned in the Introduction, the problem
arose when Demich, who had previously told police and a grand jury that Dowd had
beaten her, recanted her story at Dowd’s bond hearing.83 At trial, the prosecution
attempted to call a licensed psychiatrist as an expert witness.84 The psychiatrist was
to testify on the characteristics of a battering relationship and how a woman suffering
from the battered woman syndrome will often recant or retract earlier statements
implicating her significant other for abuse.85 The trial court cited Pargeon and found
that the state could not offer expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome in a
domestic violence prosecution.86
The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding “no reason to deviate from the Fifth
District’s analysis in Pargeon.”87 The court was especially concerned that the expert
testimony “could create the potentially prejudicial inference that Dowd has the
propensity to beat Demich and that he did so on this particular occasion.”88
80
Id. The court cited the syllabus in Koss, which states,
[a]dmission of expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome does not
establish a new defense or justification. It is to assist the trier of fact to determine
whether the defendant acted out of an honest belief that she is in imminent danger of
death or great bodily harm and that the use of such force was her only means of
escape.
Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 971.
81

Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d. at 668. The court also addressed the issue of whether Diane
Roberts, as Director of the Licking County Battered Woman’s Shelter, qualified as an expert
on the battered woman syndrome. Id. at 666. The court held that, “[t]he competency of a
witness to testify as an expert (and thus give opinion testimony) is directed to the sound
discretion of the trial court and is to be determined by the court as a matter of law.” Id. at 667.
The jury must determine whether they believe the witness’ testimony is credible and decide
what weight to give the opinion testimony. Id. The court stated that this rule “applies to any
opinion testimony, not just expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome.” Id.
82

Dowd, No. 93CA005638, 1994 WL 18645 at *1.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

Id.

87

Id. at *2.

88

Id. The court acknowledged that, based on photographs of her injuries, Demich was
assaulted, but held that the issue for the jury to determine was whether Dowd committed the
assault. Id. Excluding evidence on the syndrome, however, essentially shut the door on the
prosecution’s case and sent Demich back into her abusive relationship with Dowd.
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The practical effect of the holdings in Dowd and Pargeon is the complete
dismantling of the prosecution’s case. In Pargeon the defense was given a free pass
to attack the credibility of the victim by implying that she would have left the
relationship if she had actually been abused. In Dowd, where the victim recanted,
the situation was much more bleak. The prosecution was left with a few photographs
of Demich’s injuries and perhaps some testimony of outside witnesses, but the
absence of the victim’s testimony most certainly crippled the case.89
IV. PROSECUTORIAL USE OF THE SYNDROME OUTSIDE OF OHIO
Several jurisdictions outside of Ohio have addressed the admissibility of expert
testimony on the battered woman syndrome. An overwhelming majority of these
jurisdictions, even while operating under rules of evidence that mirror Ohio’s, have
allowed prosecutors to introduce at least some form of expert testimony on the
battered woman syndrome.90
With its Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Ciskie, Washington became the
first state to allow prosecutorial use of the battered woman syndrome.91 The
defendant in Ciskie was charged with four counts of rape over a 23-month period
with a woman with whom he had an intimate relationship.92 At trial, counsel for
89

There are several other instances outside of self-defense and domestic violence cases
where attempts have been made to introduce expert testimony on the battered woman
syndrome in Ohio courts. In State v. Lundgren, No. 90-L-15-125, 1994 WL 171657 (Ohio
App. 11 Dist. 1994), Alice Lundgren sought the reversal of her conviction on several counts
resulting from the kidnapping and murder of five family members at her residence in Kirtland,
Ohio. Id. at *1. Lundgren challenged several evidentiary rulings by the trial judge including
one involving expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome. Id. At trial, Lundgren
sought to admit testimony on the battered woman syndrome to show that she was in a state of
duress at the time of the murder because she was under the control of her abusive husband. Id.
at *18. The trial court refused to allow the testimony and the Eleventh District Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision citing Koss and O.R.C. § 2901.06 as limiting the use of
testimony on the battered woman syndrome to self-defense cases. Id.
State v. Sonko, No. 95CA006181, 1996 WL 267749 (Ohio App. 9 Dist. 1996), involved
Melissa Sonko’s appeal of her conviction for aggravated trafficking in drugs. Id. at *1. Sonko
was convicted along with her boyfriend Robert Mantelero for attempting to sell lysergic acid
diethylamide (LSD). Id. At trial, Sonko attempted to present expert testimony on the battered
woman syndrome to explain why she had agreed to participate in the selling of the LSD. Id. at
*3. Again, the trial court excluded the evidence and the Ninth District Court of Appeals
affirmed this decision citing Koss, O.R.C.§ 2901.06, Pargeon, and Dowd. Id.
90

See note 11, supra; see also Rogers, supra note 6, at 69.

91

751 P.2d 1165 (Wash. 1988); see also Rogers, supra note 6, at 78.

92

Ciskie, 751 P.2d at 1166-67. The facts in Ciskie offer an all too vivid description how a
woman can become entrapped in the vicious cycle of domestic violence. The record states
that the victim was a 55-year-old who met Ciskie in a bar. Id .at 1167. He was the first man
she was involved with since her divorce. Id. Just less than a year after they met, and three
months after Ciskie lost his job, the relationship began to deteriorate. Id. She testified that she
tried to “cool” the relationship, but Ciskie kept demanding to see her and called her
repeatedly. Id. She also testified that Ciskie had a drinking problem at this time. Their first
sexual incident occurred approximately two months later when they had a “physical fight”
because the victim would not go to bed with Ciskie. Id. The victim testified that Ciskie called
several times the next day to apologize. Id. She testified that she continued contact with
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defense claimed that the sexual acts were consensual, as evidenced by the victim’s
failure to report the incidents immediately or to leave the relationship.93 In fact, the
defense team had Ciskie, over the vigorous objections of the prosecutor, personally
question the alleged victim during the defense case.94 He asked the alleged victim,
“If I did as you – as you have said I’d done, why didn’t you call the police?”95
In an attempt to explain the victim’s refusal to leave Ciskie, the prosecution
introduced an expert to testify as to the symptoms a hypothetical victim suffering
from the battered woman syndrome would exhibit.96 She testified that “the failure of
the woman in the hypothetical to report the sexual assaults until two days after the
last incident and nine months after the first, was characteristic of a person suffering
from the battered woman syndrome.”97 The trial court admitted the expert testimony
and Ciskie was convicted of several counts of rape.98
The Supreme Court of Washington found battered woman evidence useful to
help the trier of fact, and thus properly admitted under Washington Evidence Rule
702.99 The court relied heavily on its decision four years earlier in State v. Allery,100
which allowed expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome to support a
woman’s claim of self-defense.101 The court in Allery stated the following with
regard to expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome:
Where the psychologist is qualified to testify about the battered woman
syndrome, and the defendant establishes her identity as a battered woman,
expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome is admissible. This
evidence may have a substantial bearing on the woman’s perceptions and
Ciskie because she “felt sorry for him.” Id. This pattern of repeated sexual violence followed
by contrition for several months, including the four alleged incidents of rape for which Ciskie
was charged. Id. The record continues by describing with great detail the terror that the
victim in Ciskie was subjected to over the next several months. Id.
93

Id. at 1168-69.

94

Id. at 1173.

95
Id. Furthermore, the defense challenged the victim’s credibility by explaining to the jury
that her failure to leave the relationship and to not call the authorities was “inconsistent with
that of a rape victim.” Id.
96
Id. at 1166, 1173. The State, at defense counsel’s request, asked the expert to express
her opinion about a hypothetical case history that paralleled the evidence presented by the
State in Ciskie. Id. at 1173. The expert said that “woman in the hypothetical case history
suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder,” and the facts “were consistent with the cycle
theory of violence.” Id.
97

Id.

98

Id. at 1166, 1169.

99

Id. at 1166, 1171. Washington Evidence Rule 702 states the following: “If scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to dtermine a fact in inssue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”
WASH. R. EVID. 702.
100

682 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1984).

101

Id. at 316.
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behavior at the time of the killing and is central to her claim of selfdefense.102
Over the objection of the dissent, the majority in Ciskie refused to read the
language in Allery as limiting the admissibility of expert testimony to self-defense
cases.103 According to the majority, Allery required only that the testimony be
“helpful to the jury’s understanding of the victim’s perceptions and behavior.”104
The Washington Supreme Court held that the trial court had “fully complied” with
this guideline in admitting the expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome
introduced by the prosecution.105
The court was concerned that the testimony might present a danger of unfair
prejudice under Washington Evidence Rule 403.106 The court held, however, that the
trial court properly limited the expert’s testimony by not allowing her specifically to
diagnose the alleged victim as a rape victim.107 The expert may testify only to
hypothetical situations and must avoid offering any specific opinion on the case at
bar.
The decision in Ciskie opened the door for what now appears to be a modern
trend towards allowing prosecutorial introduction of battered woman evidence.108
102

Id.

103
Justice Dore’s dissent argued that, “[n]othing in Allery suggests use of the battered
woman testimony as affirmative evidence to prove elements of the crime charged.” Ciskie,
751 P.2d at 1176. The difference between a self-defense claim and a prosecution for domestic
violence, Justice Dore states, is that the woman’s state of mind is at issue in a self-defense
case. Id. Testimony on the battered woman syndrome helps the jury understand the
defendant’s state of mind at the time she murdered her abuser. Id. “Battered woman
testimony plays no such role in a rape prosecution.” Id. Justice Dore also contended that the
lack of understanding of battering relationships that an average member of the jury may have,
“is not a sufficient ground to admit expert testimony that other wise has only limited probative
value but substantial prejudicial impact on the defendant. Id. at 1177.
104

Id. at 1172.

105

Id. at 1174.

106

Id. at 1173. Washington Evidence Rule 403 states the following: “Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the isues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” WASH. R. EVID. 403.
107
Ciskie, 751 P.2d at 1173-74. The trial court permitted the expert to testify that she had
diagnosed the alleged victim as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. at 1173. She
qualified this statement by acknowledging that the “stressors” that might cause the disorder
“could be any unusual stressful event, not necessarily a rape or assault.” Id. The trial court
would not allow the prosecutors to question the expert on what she believed the “stressor” to
be in the alleged victim’s case. Id. at 1173-74. The Washington Supreme Court believed that,
while this diagnosis “was not necessarily helpful to the trier of fact,” it was not overly
prejudicial to the defendant. Id. at 1174. If the trial court would have allowed the expert to
diagnose the alleged victim as a rape victim the testimony would have likely been
inadmissible under Evidence Rule 403. Id.
108

See Rogers, supra note 6, at 69. Rogers notes that prior to 1991, only five jurisdictions
had addressed the issue of prosecutorial use of expert testimony on the battered woman
syndrome. Id. at 68, 92. She continues by stating that between 1991 and 1997 “appellate
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The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, with its decision in State v.
Frost,109 was one of the first courts to follow in the footsteps of the Washington
Supreme Court.
Frost involved the prosecution of Gregory Frost for violation of a restraining
order and abuse of his girlfriend.110 At trial, the defense attacked the credibility of
the victim on the theory that she was not in an abusive situation because, on the day
of the alleged incident, the victim had consensual sex with Frost and spent the whole
day talking with him.111 They argued that she fabricated the story to get back at
Frost.112 The prosecution introduced expert testimony on the battered woman
syndrome in an attempt to bolster the victim’s credibility.113 Again the expert
testified to a lengthy hypothetical situation mirroring the actual case at bar. She
testified that the victim’s failure to call for help on the day of the incident “was
consistent with the battered woman syndrome.”114
The court held that the expert’s testimony was admissible as evidence to bolster
the victim’s credibility.115 As in Ciskie, the court in Frost was faced with precedent
allowing expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome in support of a victim of
domestic violence’s claim of self-defense.116 The court rejected the view that
courts in at least thirteen more jurisdictions ruled on the admissibility of expert testimony to
explain a battering victim’s puzzling behavior at or before trial.” Id. at 69. Of those thirteen
jurisdictions, Ohio was the only one to fail to approve the prosecutorial use of expert
testimony (Pargeon). Id.
109

577 A.2d 1282 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).

110

Id. at 1284. Frost and his girlfriend had been romantically involved for over three years
prior to this incident. Id. The couple had a violent relationship, and, in fact, the police had
been called to the victim’s apartment approximately nine times due to domestic disputes. Id.
at 1285. The victim had gotten a restraining order against Frost due to “fights and because
they were no longer able to get along.” Id. On the date in question in this case, Frost had just
gotten out of jail and returned to see the victim. Id. at 1284. Frost entered the victim’s house
and began to yell at her and hit her. Id. The victim tried to leave, but when she could not get
the front door open, Frost approached her and cut her arm with a box cutter. Id. She
proceeded to talk with him and they ended up having sex to “calm him down.” Id. They spent
the better part of the day together until the police were called to the house due to a domestic
disturbance. Id. at 1285.
111

Id. at 1288.

112

Id.

113
Id. at 1286. The expert testified on eight behavioral characteristics from which battered
women suffer from. She stated that the victim was suffering from battered woman syndrome
because she exhibited “a very high degree of seven out of eight of the characteristics: low selfconcept, belief in the family unit, a belief that her pregnancy would end the abuse, a history of
abuse in her own family, self-blame, and a fear that defendant would come back no matter
where she was.” Id. at 1287.
114

Id.

115

Id. at 1288.

116

Id. at 1287; see Kelly, 478 A.2d 364. In Kelly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
allowed expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome intended to explain the defendant’s
state of mind and to bolster her claim of self-defense. Id. at 375-76.
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precedent from self-defense cases necessarily limited the use of such testimony to
self-defense.117 Rather, the court explained, “there is nothing about the testimony
itself which makes it inappropriate for admission as part of the State’s case in chief
where the woman eventually asserts herself and reports her abuser to the authorities,
before she becomes the defendant on trial for committing murder.”118
One federal court has also considered the issue and has permitted battered
woman evidence. The Eighth Circuit faced this issue in Arcoren v. United States.119
The defendant in Arcoren was charged with the aggravated sexual abuse of his
wife.120 The victim initially testified to the grand jury that her husband had sexually
and physically assaulted her, but she recanted her testimony when called as a witness
at trial.121 The District Court of South Dakota allowed the prosecution to introduce
testimony on the battered woman syndrome to explain the victim’s recantation.122
The expert testified as to the general characteristics associated with the battered
woman syndrome based on her knowledge and experience with the subject.123
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that the jury was “faced with
a bizarre situation” because of the victim’s recantation of her story.124 The court felt
that the expert testimony would provide an explanation to the jury as to why the
victim would act in such a manner.125 The court further held that there was “no
persuasive reason” for limiting testimony on the battered woman syndrome to claims
of self-defense.126 The court, however, limited the scope of the expert’s testimony,
stating that the expert should not express any opinion on whether the particular
victim suffers from symptoms of the battered woman syndrome.127
Also instructive is the case of State v. Cababag, from the Hawaii Intermediate
Court of Appeals.128 Cababag involved the prosecution of Alfred Cababag for the
117

Frost, 577 A.2d at 1287.

118

Id.

119
929 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 1991). This case was in Federal court because it involved
Indians and took place on an Indian Reservation.
120

Id. at 1237-38.

121

Id. At trial the victim denied that defendant had abused her, and stated that the cuts and
bruises on her faces were from an earlier motorbike wreck. Id. at 1238. She stated that, “she
could not remember making the statements or that, where she did recall making them, they
were incorrect. Id.
122

Id. at 1238-39. The prosecution initially used the victim’s grand jury testimony to
impeach her later recantation at trial. Id. at 1238. To further support its case the government
called an expert witness to testify regarding the battered woman syndrome. Id.
123

Id. at 1239. The District Court, while acknowledging that the testimony was admissible
under Evidence Rule 702, warned that the expert could not “testify as to the ultimate fact that
a particular party in this case . . . actually suffers from battered woman syndrome.” Id.
124

Id. at 1240.

125

Id.

126

Id. at 1241.

127

Id.

128

850 P.2d 716 (Haw. Ct. App. 1993).
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abuse of his girlfriend Susan Cuthbertson.129 At trial, Cuthbertson stated that she
“made up” her previous statements to police implicating Cababag as her batterer.130
Over the objection of defense counsel, the prosecution called a witness to testify as
an expert on domestic violence.131 The trial court allowed the testimony and
Cababag was convicted of abuse of family and household members.132
After acknowledging that the testimony met the requirements of Hawaii
Evidence Rule 702, the Court of Appeals turned its focus to the limitations of Hawaii
Evidence Rule 403.133 Hawaii Evidence Rule 403 operates in effectively the same
manner as Ohio Evidence Rule 403. Hawaii Evidence Rule 403 excludes relevant
evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.”134 The trial court placed several limitations on the expert’s testimony to
avoid unfairly prejudicing the defendant:
[The expert] will not be permitted to express any opinion about whether
abuse occurred in the instant case, or whether the alleged victim’s report
of abuse, either to the police initially, or in her testimony at trial, is
truthful or untruthful . . . . The court will not allow (the expert) to state
what percentage of alleged victims are female versus what percentage are
male . . . . The court will not allow (the expert) to offer any testimony of
predicting future violence by Cababag . . . .135
Counsel for the defense argued that, despite the limitations set by the trial court, the
probative value of the testimony was still outweighed by its prejudicial effect.136 The
Court of Appeals, however, denied this argument and affirmed the decision of the
trial court.137
The preceding cases are only a sampling of the several jurisdictions that have
allowed some form of testimony on the battered woman syndrome in domestic
violence prosecutions. Many, if not all, of these jurisdictions that have allowed
prosecutorial use of the battered woman syndrome have set forth limitations similar

129

Id. at 718.

130

Id. at 719.

131

Id. The expert testified on the general characteristics of a victim of domestic violence,
including recantation. Id. at 719-20.
132

Id. at 717.

133

Id. at 720-22. The relevant portion of Hawaii Evidence Rule 702 is as follows: “If
scientific technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.” HAW. R. EVID. 702.
134

HAW. R. EVID. 403.

135

Cababag, 850 P.2d at 719.

136

Id. at 720.

137

Id. at 722-23. In support of its holding, the court actually acknowledged the Ohio
Supreme Court’s decision in Koss. Id. at 721. The court also stated that its holding in this
case was “in accord with Arcoren v. United States.” Id. at 722.
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to those in Ciskie, Frost, and Arcoren.138 The decisions in these cases provide
several guiding principles that can be applied to prosecutorial attempts to use expert
testimony on the battered woman syndrome in Ohio. The next part of this note will
attempt to incorporate these principles into a potential framework for the
prosecutorial introduction of testimony on the syndrome in Ohio.
V. DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROPER USE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON
THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES
The Supreme Court of Ohio has yet to address this issue. The court, however,
will surely feel increased pressure to address this issue in the coming years as a result
of the emerging trend supporting admissibility,139 and the continued prevalence of
battering relationships.140 This Part first discusses the applicable rules of evidence in
Ohio, with which any potential framework for admissibility must comply. Second, it
attempts to refute the arguments presented in Pargeon and Dowd against
admissibility. Finally, it proposes a framework for the prosecutorial use of expert
testimony that will provide the best opportunity for having the precedent set in
Pargeon and Dowd overturned.
A. The Ohio Rules of Evidence
Ohio Evidence Rule 702 specifically governs the admissibility of testimony by
experts.141 Under Rule 702, a witness may testify as an expert if all of the following
apply:
(A)

The witness’ testimony either relates to matters beyond the
knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a
misconception common among lay persons;

138

See, e.g., State v. Stringer, 897 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1995). For example, the defendant in
Stringer was charged with assault and aggravated kidnapping. Id. at 1065. The state
introduced testimony on the battered woman syndrome to explain why the victim had recanted
her story that her ex-husband had committed the acts. Id. at 1067. While the Supreme Court
of Montana held that the evidence in the case at bar was improperly admitted because the
prosecution failed to show that the alleged victim was actually a victim of domestic violence,
the court held that expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome should generally be
admissible in domestic violence prosecutions. Id. at 1069. The court cautioned, however, that
the expert should not testify as to whether the alleged victim’s statements were credible or as
to whether, in her opinion, the alleged victim was an actual victim of domestic violence. Id.
In State v. Borrelli, 629 A.2d 1105 (Conn. 1993), the defense objected to the prosecution’s
introduction of expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome on the grounds that it was
actually opinion testimony as to the credibility of a witness and therefore should have been
excluded because it improperly invaded the province of the jury. Id. at 1115. The court held
that the testimony was properly admitted, however, because the expert did not testify that the
victim was, in fact, battered nor presented any opinion testimony as to the credibility of any
other witness. Id.; see also Rogers, supra note 6, at 79-80.
139

See Part IV, supra.

140

See Part II.A, supra.

141

OHIO R. EVID. 702.
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(B)

The witness is qualified as an expert by specialized knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education regarding the subject
matter of the testimony;

(C)

The witness’ testimony is based on reliable scientific, technical,
or other specialized information . . . .142

Two additional Rules apply to battered woman evidence. First, Evidence Rule
403 provides an exception to the rule that all relevant evidence is admissible. Ohio
Evidence Rule 403 provides that “[a]lthough relevant, evidence is not admissible if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of
confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury.”143
Second, Ohio Evidence Rule 404 limits the use of evidence on the character of
the accused and the victim.144 Generally, under Rule 404, “[e]vidence of a person’s
character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purposes of proving that
he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.”145 There are, however,
exceptions to this general rule:
(1)

Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same is admissible….

(2)

Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the
crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same…is admissible….146

Additionally, Rule 404 prohibits evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
introduced to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith.147
B. Removing the Barriers Set Forth in Pargeon and Dowd
1. Ohio Evidence Rule 702
Initially, Ohio Evidence Rule 702 was cited as the primary reason for excluding
any expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome.148 As stated previously, the
Ohio Supreme Court believed that the battered woman syndrome did not meet the

142

Id.

143

OHIO R. EVID. 403(A). The trial court must exclude all evidence that falls under
subsection (A). Id. Subsection (B) provides a discretionary restriction on relevant evidence.
OHIO R. EVID. 403(B). Subsection (B) states: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by considerations of undue delay, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.” Id.
144

OHIO R. EVID. 404.

145

OHIO R. EVID. 404(A).

146

OHIO R. EVID. 404(A)(1)-(2) (emphases added).

147

OHIO R. EVID. 404(B).

148

Thomas, 423 N.E.2d 137; see Part V.A., supra, for the text of Ohio Evidence Rule 702.
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requirements of Rule 702 because its subject matter was within the understanding of
the jury and not sufficiently developed as a matter of commonly accepted scientific
knowledge.149 Rule 702, however, no longer provides a barrier to the admission of
expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome.
As previously discussed, the Ohio Supreme Court in Koss, officially recognized
that testimony on the battered woman syndrome dispelled common misconceptions
about abused women common among lay persons.150 Additionally, the court held
that the subject matter of the syndrome had gained substantial scientific acceptance
to warrant admissibility.151 Thus, the court has clearly acknowledged that testimony
on the battered woman syndrome satisfies the Rule 702 threshold requirements for
expert testimony.
Furthermore, the Ohio General Assembly, with the enactment of O.R.C.
§ 2901.06, formally accepted the battered woman syndrome as satisfying the Rule
702 requirements for expert testimony.152 Section 2901.06 reiterated that the battered
woman syndrome is a matter of commonly accepted scientific knowledge and that
the subject matter and details of the syndrome are not within the general
understanding of an average lay person.153 Therefore, in light of the enactment of
§ 2901.06 and the decision in Koss, Ohio Evidence Rule 702 no longer provides an
obstruction to the prosecutorial introduction of expert testimony on the battered
woman syndrome.154 This contention is further supported by the fact that Rule 702
was not cited as a reason to bar testimony on the battered woman syndrome in both
Pargeon and Dowd.
2. Evidence Rule 403
While the courts in Pargeon and Dowd did not cite to Evidence Rule 702, they
did hold that Evidence Rule 403 prohibited the prosecutorial introduction of
testimony on the battered woman syndrome.155 Both courts maintained that the
probative value of expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant in a domestic violence
149

Id. at 140; Ssee Part III.A., supra, for a discussion on the court’s decision in Thomas.

150

Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 973-74; see Part III.A., supra, for discussion on the court’s
decision in Koss.
151

Id. at 974.

152

See Part III.A., supra, for a full discussion on the language of § 2901.06.

153

OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2901.06(A)(1)-(2) (West 2003).

154
Although Koss was a murder case where the defendant introduced testimony on the
battered woman syndrome in support of her claim of self-defense, it necessarily follows that
the court’s analysis on the syndrome in and of itself would apply to prosecutorial use of the
syndrome. See Part III.A., supra, for a discussion of Justice Resnick’s opinion in Koss.
Justice Resnick recognized the merits of the syndrome as a matter outside of the jury’s
knowledge and acknowledges the scientific merits of the syndrome. The subject matter of the
battered woman syndrome approved by Justice Resnick in Koss and by the Ohio General
Assembly in § 2901.06 is the same subject matter that would be used by prosecutors in
domestic violence cases.
155

Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d at 666; Dowd, 1994 WL 18645 at *1; see Part III.B., supra, for a
discussion on the decisions in Pargeon and Dowd.
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prosecution.156 Neither court, however, provided any rationale to support this
contention.157
As mentioned earlier, prosecutors encounter difficulties in domestic violence
prosecutions that they would not otherwise encounter in most non-domestic-violence
related criminal prosecutions. Victims of domestic violence often refuse to testify or
recant prior stories implicating their significant other, or they may be attacked on the
witness stand for failing to leave their alleged batter or report battering incidents to
the police.158 Therefore, as all other jurisdictions to consider the issue have
acknowledged, the probative value of expert testimony on the battered woman
syndrome to prosecutors in such cases is extremely high. The testimony allows the
prosecution an opportunity to explain to the jury this seemingly abnormal behavior
by the alleged victim.159
Moreover, Justice Resnick recognized the probative value of testimony on the
battered woman syndrome with her dicta in the Koss decision.160 She noted that
expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome would “help dispel the ordinary
lay person’s perception that a woman in a battering relationship is free to leave at
any time,” and “counter any ‘common sense’ conclusions by the jury that if the
beatings were really that bad the woman would have left her husband much
earlier.”161 That Justice Resnick’s statements were made in the context of a selfdefense case is irrelevant because she was describing the probative value of
testimony on the battered woman syndrome in and of itself and not specifically in
self-defense cases. This is evidenced by her statement that “[e]xpert testimony
regarding the battered woman syndrome can be admitted to help the jury not only to
understand the battered woman syndrome but also to determine whether the
defendant had reasonable grounds for an honest belief that she was in imminent
danger when considering the issue of self-defense.”162
It is only in light of such high probative value that the prejudicial impact of
prosecutorial introduction of testimony on the battered woman syndrome should be
analyzed. While some commentators urge caution in approaching this Rule 403
balance,163 it has been observed that “[t]estimony concerning Battered Woman
156

Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d at 666; see also Dowd, 1994 WL 18645 at *1.

157

The court in Pargeon simply stated that “[t]he probative value of such testimony is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and therefore its exclusion is
mandatory.” 582 N.E.2d at 666. The court in Dowd simply cited to the holding in Pargeon on
this issue and stated that they would not deviate from it. 1994 WL 18645 at *1.
158

Rogers, supra note 6, at 68.

159

See Arcoren, 929 F.2d at 1240; see also Ciskie, 751 P.2d 1165 at 1173.

160

See Part III.A., supra.

161

Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 973.

162

Id. (emphasis added).

163

See Faigman & Wright, supra note 8, at 98-99. Faigman and Wright state that “[t]he
Rule 403 balance does not obviously favor admission of the syndrome to bolster the credibility
of a prosecution witness,” because of its low probative value. Id. at 98. They also contend
that the battered woman syndrome was not designed with this use in mind and that battered
women are not more likely to recant previous statements at trial than anyone else. Id.
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Syndrome is not unduly prejudicial to the defendant because virtually all the
evidence presented concerns behavioral characteristics of the battered woman, not
the abuser.”164 However, even acknowledging that some potential for prejudice does
exist, it does not justify outright exclusion. Rule 403 is a balancing test between
probative value and potential prejudicial impact. As several courts have declared,
the potential danger of prejudice in domestic violence cases can be significantly
diminished by properly limiting the scope of the testimony.165 Where the expert
limits testimony to the general characteristics of the battered woman syndrome and
hypothetical situations, the probative value of such testimony is not outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice.
Prosecutors in Ohio should adhere to these limitations when presenting expert
testimony on the battered woman syndrome in domestic violence cases. This will
put them in the best position when a court is called upon again to make a Rule 403
balancing judgment on the testimony. The prosecutor in Pargeon clearly failed to
adhere to these limitations when introducing testimony on the syndrome and as a
result the court refused to admit it. The prosecutor offered the testimony to “prove
that [Pargeon’s] wife was a battered woman suffering from the battered woman
syndrome.”166 This testimony would not have been admitted under the standards set
forth in Ciskie and Arcoren because it was being used to identify the specific witness
as suffering from battered woman syndrome. Prosecutors in Ohio must focus on
limiting any potential testimony to the characteristics of the battered woman
syndrome in general and responses to hypothetical questions.
3. Ohio Evidence Rule 404
In addition to Evidence Rule 403, the courts in both Pargeon and Dowd cited
Evidence Rule 404 as a second reason to bar battered woman syndrome testimony.167
The court in Pargeon held that “evidence that appellant’s wife is a battered woman
really serves as evidence of the prior bad acts of the appellant from which the
inference may be drawn that appellant has the propensity to beat his wife and that he
beat her on this particular occasion,” which is prohibited under Evidence Rule
404(B).168 Again, the problem is that the prosecutor in Pargeon attempted to
introduce testimony that specifically identified the alleged victim as suffering from
the battered woman syndrome. Thus, Pargeon can easily be distinguished from the
numerous cases outside of Ohio that have held that testimony on the battered woman
syndrome in domestic violence productions does not violate Evidence Rule 404.
By avoiding testimony identifying the alleged victim as suffering from the
battered woman syndrome, a prosecutor will avoid Rule 404 prohibition. The expert
witness in Arcoren expressed no opinion on whether the alleged victim suffered from

164

See Patton, supra note 15, at 13.

165
See Ciskie, 751 P.2d at 1173-74; Arcoren, 929 F.2d at 1241; Cababag, 850 P.2d at 719;
Borrelli, 629 A.2d at 1115; see also People v. Morgan, 58 Cal. App. 4th 1210 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997).
166

Pargeon, 582 N.E. at 666.

167

Id.; see also Dowd, 1994 WL 18645 at *1.

168

Pargeon, 582 N.E. at 666.
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the syndrome or on which of her conflicting statements was more credible.169 The
court held that the expert did not “interfere or impinge upon the jury’s role in
determining the credibility of witnesses.”170 Her testimony simply aided the jury in
evaluating the evidence that was presented by the prosecution.171 Therefore, by
limiting the expert’s testimony to describing the characteristics of the battered
woman syndrome generally and answering only hypothetical questions, the
prosecution will avoid violating Evidence Rule 404.
The decision in Dowd is somewhat more troubling because the expert there was
to testify concerning the characteristics of a battering relationship and that it was not
uncommon for those who suffer from the battered woman syndrome to recant
previous statements that they were abused.172 However, the Dowd court’s Rule 404
“analysis,” such as it was, seems plainly mistaken. The court failed to recognize this
distinguishing fact and simply adhered to the holding in Pargeon, rejecting the
testimony. The court did not provide any analysis on why it felt this limited form of
testimony violated Rule 404. Therefore, Dowd really should be given no weight
when discussing the merits of such limited testimony under Rule 404.
4. State v. Koss
Evidence Rules 403 and 404 were not the only bars to prosecutorial introduction
of the battered woman syndrome cited in Pargeon and Dowd. A “more compelling
reason” for the exclusion of such testimony, according to the court in Pargeon, was
that the Ohio Supreme Court in Koss had limited the use of testimony on the battered
woman syndrome to cases where a defendant uses it in support of her claim of selfdefense.173 Such a narrow reading of the decision in Koss, however, is not required.
An examination of Justice Resnick’s language in the majority opinion in Koss
fails to reveal any language indicating that the court intended to limit the use of
testimony on the syndrome to self-defense cases. Absent from Justice Resnick’s
opinion is any statement that expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome may
only be introduced in cases where the defendant asserts the affirmative defense of
self-defense. The holding in Koss states only the following: “Where the evidence
establishes that a woman is a battered woman, and when an expert is qualified to
testify about the battered woman syndrome, expert testimony concerning the
syndrome may be admitted to assist the trier of fact in determining whether the
defendant acted in self-defense.”174 This holding simply asserts that self-defense
cases are one of the permissible categories of cases in which expert testimony on the
battered woman syndrome may be admitted. Had Justice Resnick intended to limit
the testimony to such cases, she could have easily done so by stating that testimony
“may be admitted . . . only in self-defense cases.” The majority opinion in Koss, thus
is neither a restriction on, nor an endorsement of the use of expert testimony on the
syndrome in domestic violence cases.
169

Arcoren, 929 F.2d at 1241.

170

Id.

171

Id.
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Dowd, 1994 WL 18645 at *1.
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Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d at 666.
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Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 975 (emphasis added).
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One court that has addressed Koss has come to a similar conclusion regarding the
ambiguity of its language.175 In State v. Daws, the Second District Court of Appeals
heard Susan Daws’ appeal from her conviction for voluntary manslaughter.176 The
primary issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred by precluding Daws’ expert
from testifying regarding whether Daws reasonably believed that she was in
imminent danger and needed to use deadly force on the night of the shooting.177 The
court encountered difficulty when it attempted to interpret Justice Resnick’s
statement that expert testimony on the syndrome could be admitted to “help the jury
not only understand the battered woman syndrome,” but also to “determine whether
defendant had reasonable grounds for an honest belief that she was in imminent
danger when considering the issue of self-defense.”178 The court offered the
following interpretation:
Nowhere in its opinion did the court define or explain what it meant by
“expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome” or in what
context such testimony could be used. Only the purpose for the admission
of such testimony is clear. That is, expert testimony on the battered
woman syndrome is to be admitted for both its original purpose of
dispelling the misconceptions of jurors concerning battered women and its
broader purpose of informing the jurors’ determination of whether the
accused’s beliefs and use of force were reasonable.179
The court concluded that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Koss did “not establish the
limits, if any, on expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome.”180
While not finding any limitations set forth in Koss, Daws did define two
permissible purposes for use of the syndrome based on Koss: 1) dispelling the
misconceptions of jurors concerning battered women; and 2) informing the jurors’
determination of whether the accused’s beliefs and use of force were reasonable.181
Prosecutorial use of the syndrome clearly falls under the first permissible purpose.
This interpretation of the language in Koss is inconsistent with that of Pargeon and
Dowd, but is in line with the interpretation advocated in this note.
The contention that Koss is not a limitation is further supported by the case law
from outside Ohio that has addressed this exact issue. As previously discussed, the
defense counsel in Ciskie argued that Allery, a previous Washington Supreme Court
decision allowing testimony on the battered woman syndrome in a self-defense case,
limited the use of testimony on the syndrome to such cases.182 Over Justice Dore’s
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Daws, 662 N.E.2d 805.

176

Id. at 810.

177

Id.

178

Id. at 812.

179

Id.

180

Id.

181

Id.

182

See Part IV, supra, for a full discussion on how the court in Ciskie addressed the
precedent set by Allery.
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dissent,183 the court failed to find such a limitation set forth in Allery. This decision
is highly instructive for purposes of this note because of the similarities between
Allery and Koss.
While the decision in Ciskie was highly instructive, the Frost case may even be
more enlightening. In Frost, counsel for the defendant argued that New Jersey
precedent had limited the use of testimony on the syndrome to self-defense cases.184
Once again the court disagreed, asserting that there was no reason to believe that the
testimony would be any more inappropriate if used by the prosecution as opposed to
the defense in a murder case.185 The court offered the following common sense
rationale to support this contention:
It would seem anomalous to allow a battered woman, where she is a
criminal defendant, to offer this type of expert testimony in order to help
the jury understand the actions she took, yet deny her the same
opportunity when she is the complaining witness and/or victim and her
abuser is the criminal defendant.186
This little bit of common sense, if adopted by Ohio courts, could go a long way in
alleviating the prevalent domestic violence problem in Ohio.
5. Ohio Revised Code § 2901.06
The second principal argument in Pargeon is that the Ohio General Assembly,
with the enactment of O.R.C. § 2901.06, limited the use of the syndrome to selfdefense cases.187 The court cited the plain text of the statute as its only rationale
supporting their contention.188 This contention is clearly fallible, however, as no
clear evidence of the General Assembly’s intent is present in the plain text of the
statute or the legislative history surrounding the enactment of § 2901.06.
As previously stated, the plain text of § 2901.06 offers persons who have been
charged with an offense involving force the opportunity to introduce testimony on
the syndrome in support of a claim of self-defense.189 There is no language present
in the statute, though, that specifically limits the use of such testimony to selfdefense cases. The Pargeon court failed to recognize this important distinction.
This distinction is further evidenced by examining the legislative history
surrounding the enactment of § 2901.06. Evidence of the legislature’s intent in
introducing House Bill 484, later codified as § 2901.06, can be seen in the following
excerpt from a Legislative Services Commission report on the bill:

183

See note 106, supra, for a discussion on Justice Dore’s dissenting opinion in Ciskie.

184

Frost, 577 A.2d at 1287; see Part IV, supra, for a full discussion on how the court in
Frost addressed the precedent set by Kelly.
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Frost, 577 A.2d at 1287.
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Id.
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Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d at 667.

188

Id.

189

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (B) (West 2003); see Part III.A., supra, for the full
text of § 2901.06.
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Declares that the General Assembly recognizes that the “battered woman
syndrome” currently is a matter of commonly accepted scientific
knowledge and that the subject matter and details of the syndrome are not
within general understanding or experience of the general public or within
the field of common knowledge.
Permits a person who is charged with an offense involving the use of
force against another and who argues self-defense to introduce expert
testimony of the "battered woman syndrome" and that the person suffered
from the syndrome.190
Furthermore, the legislative declarations section of the Legislative Services
Commission report reiterates that H.B. 484 was intended to “permit” the use of
testimony on the syndrome in self-defense cases.191 Nothing contained in the
legislative history specifically indicates that the General Assembly intended H.B.
484 to act as a limitation on the use of the syndrome. There is no evidence that
prosecutorial use of the syndrome was even contemplated by the legislature, either
negatively or positively. The only thing that can be absolutely ascertained is that the
legislature wanted to end Ohio’s past practice of disallowing all evidence on the
battered woman syndrome.
Further support for this contention can be found in the timing of the introduction
of H.B. 484. As previously stated, the bill was introduced on May 2, 1989,
approximately six months before Koss came before the Ohio Supreme Court.192
While the bill was officially signed into law after the Koss decision, the fact that it
was introduced before that decision indicates an intention on the part of the
legislature to “open the door” for testimony on the syndrome as opposed to an
intention to “close the door,” limiting its use to supporting self-defense claims. Had
the bill been introduced in the wake of the Koss decision, a much stronger argument
could be made that the legislature was trying to limit use of the syndrome to selfdefense cases such as Koss.
C. A Proposed Framework for Admission
As outlined above, the prosecutorial introduction of testimony on the battered
woman syndrome must be in accordance with the applicable Ohio Rules of
Evidence. The best way to approach this is by utilizing the limited format advocated
by the courts in Ciskie and Arcoren. Under this approach, experts who are called to
testify in domestic violence prosecutions must limit their testimony to the general
characteristics of a victim suffering from the battered woman syndrome. The expert
may also answer hypothetical questions regarding specific abnormal behaviors
exhibited by women suffering from the syndrome, but should never offer an opinion
relative to the alleged victim in the case.
The second limitation on the prosecutorial use of the syndrome involves when it
may be used. Prosecutors must limit their use of the syndrome to cases in which the
190
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victim exhibits abnormal behavior that may appear baffling to the jury. Specifically,
testimony should be offered when a victim is questioned for remaining in a battering
relationship or refusing to seek immediate police intervention, or when the victim
recants a previous statement implicating her significant other as an abuser.
Testimony on the syndrome should not be used in the absence of such circumstances
because of the danger of prejudice of the defendant. Introducing testimony on the
battered woman syndrome in this manner should give prosecutors their best chance
at approval by the courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
While conducting research for this note, the author spent quite a bit of time
viewing a wide variety of websites dealing with domestic violence issues. While he
was troubled by the horrific stories of abuse and the alarming statistics presented one
particular item truly caught his attention. On the National Domestic Violence
Hotline’s website appears the following warning: “Safety alert: Computer use can be
monitored and is impossible to completely clear. If you are afraid your internet
and/or computer usage might be monitored, please use a safer computer, call your
local hotline, and/or call the National Domestic Violence Hotline.”193 This was not a
generic warning to all computer users that an employer or the government may be
monitoring their Internet usage. This was a specific warning to victims of domestic
violence that their batterer may be monitoring their behavior on the Internet. The
author can only begin to imagine the feelings of fear and entrapment that a battered
woman must feel when they view this warning.
This type of warning clearly illustrates the problems that prosecutors face in
domestic violence prosecutions. An average person does not easily understand the
amount of control that a batterer can exert over his victim. A batterer will employ
emotional and financial coercion, destruction of property, and physical battering to
“maintain the male’s domination of his mate.”194 Acts of contrition by the batterer
further confuse the matter. The victim is led to believe that the violence is over and
that she is safe in the relationship.195 The problem is that this period of time is when
outside persons most often come into contact with the victim.196 Thus, the outside
person sees the victim in a state of apparent happiness, which makes it more difficult
to understand her actual situation.
The current state of law in Ohio provides an uphill battle for any victim that
gathers up the tremendous amount of courage necessary to leave her batterer and
report the incidents to the police. Defense attorneys have a license to assault the
victim’s credibility, questioning why she stayed in the relationship if it was so bad
and why she failed to seek police intervention at an earlier time. A jury is easily
persuaded by these arguments because they just don’t understand the situation that
these women are actually in. The problem is often intensified when the victim is
lured back into her battering relationship before trial and subsequently recants her
193

National Domestic Violence Hotline, available at http://www.ndvh.org (last visited
February 18, 2004).
194

Raeder, supra note 16, at 793.
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See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 65-70 (1979).
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See id.
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previous story. An average member of the jury would surly not understand this
action taken by the victim. They have no concept of the power that the batterer’s
contrition has over the victim, or the fact that she will almost surely be victimized
again shortly thereafter.197
The prosecution must have an opportunity to present a case in such situations.
Allowing prosecutors to introduce expert testimony on the battered woman
syndrome in the limited scope proscribed in this note will educate the average juror
on the plight of a battered woman, but not unduly prejudice the defendant. The Ohio
Supreme Court has yet to speak on this difficult issue. The fates of an extraordinary
number of women in Ohio will rest on their decision.
MATTHEW P. HAWES

197

See id.
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